Are nominal wage changes skewed away from wage cuts? commentary by Richard Startz






hen I was an undergraduate, I was 
told that maybe a little inﬂation was
a good thing because nominal
wages are downward rigid.  What’s more,
back then this accounted in part for the
Phillips curve being curved—being relative-
ly ﬂat at low inﬂation rates and steeper at
high inﬂation rates.  At low inﬂation rates,
you had to have a lot of unemployment to
get rid of a little inﬂation because nominal
wage cuts are so painful.  Downward wage
rigidity is regarded as one of those truths
that are so self-evident that there is no need
to look at the data.  Professor McLaughlin
has actually looked at the facts and said, “If
it’s so self-evident, why doesn’t it show up
in the data?”  Or, at the very least, said, “It’s
not nearly so simple.”
Let me outline six points for consideration.
• Where does wage rigidity ﬁt into macro?
• Do nominal wage changes move one-
for-one with inﬂation?
• Are wage changes skewed?
• Does the skewness change with 
inﬂation?
• Is the spike at zero big? Does its size 
change with inﬂation?
• What about the spread of the distrib-
ution? Does it change with inﬂation?
Let me begin by saying that Professor
McLaughlin’s topic is really important, that
it is really important to the Federal Reserve,
and that it is really important at exactly this
point in history.  If you take a policy win-
dow of the last two or three years and the
next two or three years (assuming a similar
economy) a critical question for monetary
policy is whether we should aim for a steady
zero inﬂation rate or for a steady 2 percent
inﬂation rate.  The argument for a zero
inﬂation rate is that zero is a magic num-
ber for political reasons and reasons of
transparency.  The argument for 2 percent
is that nominal wages are downward rigid,
and that 2 percent allows for more ﬂexible
real wages.  So McLaughlin’s paper bears
precisely on the central question of medium-
term monetary policy.
Second, using micro data is exactly 
the right way to answer this sort of ques-
tion.  It also is a lot of work.  You have to
worry about measurement error. You have
to worry about exact deﬁnitions of survey
data.  And so forth.  McLaughlin’s paper is
very well done and deserves a great deal of
appreciation for both the quantity and the
quality of the work.
By way of ﬁnal preface, where does
wage rigidity ﬁt into macro?  Speciﬁcally, 
in a recession, why don’t wages drop to clear
the market?  Let me give the old-fashioned
answer.  There are at least four places where
wage rigidity ﬁts:
First, from an old-fashioned Keynesian
viewpoint, the labor market is driven by the
demand side as in:
(1)                  
If the real wage doesn’t drop, too much
unemployment results.  In this situation, if
nominal wages are downward rigid, then
real wages surely will be.
Second, consider a model in which the
real money supply matters: perhaps quanti-
ty theory, perhaps Keynesian with a Pigou
effect, or perhaps ISLM.
(2)  or
or ISLM
(3)                    
Suppose ﬁrms set prices as a markup
over wages—maybe a competitive markup,
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wage rigidity causes nominal price rigidity
and prevents the consumer price index 
from dropping to pull the economy out 
of recession.
The third place where wage rigidity
shows up is in the slope of the Phillips
curve at low inﬂation rates.  (See Figure 1.)
If it is hard to force down wages, then 
the sacriﬁce ratio is really bad at low or
negative inﬂation rates.  One way to think
about real vs. nominal rigidity is to ask
whether the sacriﬁce ratio worsens speciﬁ-
cally near zero or just at inﬂation rates
close to expected inﬂation.
Fourth, and last, rigidity just messes 
up allocational efﬁciency.
The paper is excellent.  Nonetheless,
nobody gives a discussant credit for saying
nice things; so I want to discuss the one part
with which I disagree and then make a few
suggestions for other ways of working with
the data.
The only part of the paper with which 
I take issue is the conclusion that “nominal
wage changes move one-for-one with antici-
pated inﬂation, and are even closely linked to
unanticipated inﬂation.”  This is a question
about averages, that is, macro data.  The
author has averaged his micro wage change
data.  This is neither better nor worse than
using the usual macro data except that it is
limited to 21 annual data points.  We all agree
that, in the long run, the real wage is neutral
with respect to inﬂation.  But the short to
medium run matters, and 21 data points are
not enough to answer the question.  I’m not
saying that the answer is wrong, just that you
cannot get a deﬁnitive answer this way.
I decided to do a very small amount of
sensitivity analysis.  The numbers in Table 1,
0.84 and 0.88, are the two numbers I think
the author wanted to emphasize.  Regressing
wage on price inﬂation results in a coefﬁcient
that is marginally statistically different from
one.  The coefﬁcient also says that 7 percent
inﬂation lowers the real wage about 1 percent.
I guess that’s a small effect—but I’d like to
know if a sustained 7 percent inﬂation
would lower the real wage 1 percent every
year.  We then split the effect into anticipated
and unanticipated and see that the anticipated
effect is somewhat smaller.
Eschewing the daunting task of trying
to replicate the micro data, I chose the ﬁrst
likely looking variable from the DRI (Data
Resources, Inc.) database.  The left-most
panel of Table 1 shows McLaughlin’s 
numbers.  The middle panel replicates his
regressions using my data to demonstrate
that the data differences are not important.
In the right-hand panel, I augmented the
author’s speciﬁcation with very simple
dynamics in the form of a Koyck lag.  With
the augmented speciﬁcation, 7 percent 
inﬂation lowers the real wage by 2.3 percent,
which is a lot.  Even using anticipated inﬂa-
tion, the coefﬁcient is  statistically below 
one and economically is really far from 
one.  This does not mean the right panel 
is better than the left; it just means that 
21 annual data points are not the right 
way to answer this question.
Are wage changes skewed?  Absolutely!
Some people have taken this as evidence
that the lower tail is truncated.  Of course,
while truncation may imply skewness,
skewness need not imply truncation.  The
author did something clever; he looked for
skewness far from zero and found it.  So
while there is some truncation, there are
other factors producing skewness.  So we
Figure 1
Illustration of Phillips Curves  
with Nominal vs. Real Wage Rigidity
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should be careful about interpreting skew-
ness per se  as evidence of wage rigidity.
Is this skewness correlated with inﬂa-
tion?  The author’s Table 4 says no.  If
skewness results from wage rigidity and
inﬂation reduces wage rigidity, then inﬂa-
tion should reduce skewness.  Strikingly,
there is no evidence for inﬂation reducing
skewness.  I wonder if there is a way to
estimate the power of these tests, in the
economic rather than statistical sense.
One suggestion is to write a simple model
of nominal wage setting calibrated twice—
once for parameters where all would agree
that nominal rigidity is important and one
with the opposite assumption.  Then one
would generate simulated data from each,
compute the statistics in Table 4, and
determine the extent to which the two
simulation results differ.
Is there a big spike at zero?  There is a
spike, but what metric tells us whether the
spike is large?  In addition to the size of the
spike, the author discussed the amount of
censoring.  It would be useful to have a
table or some guided comparison of the
zero spike and estimated censoring against
inﬂation to see if it tells the same story.
Let me turn to the question of the variance
of wage changes rather than the skewness.
Take an example from life.  I wear two hats.
I spend 80 percent of my time  as an econo-
mist and another 80 percent as department
chair.  I assign wage changes in my depart-
ment, so for the University of Washington I
know what the process is.  The University of
Washington faculty is about a third the size
of the PSID sample.  Straight-time wages are
downward rigid.  By this I mean there is no
place on the form I complete to lower wages.
It literally cannot happen.  And I hazard the
same thing is true for half the attendees of the
October meeting.
When I give raises I have a dollar-bud-
get constraint as well as a non-negativity
constraint.  So downward rigidity cannot
have any effect on the average wage change.
The histogram in Figure 2 gives a ﬁctional,
but I think accurate, picture of what hap-
pens at different inﬂation rates.  At a 10 
percent average increase, there are maybe
two raises at 6 percent to one raise at 18
percent.  At a 4 percent average increase,
there might be two raises at 2 percent to
one raise at 8 percent.  At high inﬂation,
there’s a 12 percent change in relative real
Regression of Wage Inflation on Price Inflation
Variable  Author Inﬂation Process  Macro Data Inﬂation Process  Macro Data Inﬂation Process
ARIMA(0,1,1)        AR(3)  ARIMA(0,1,1)      AR(3)  ARIMA(0,1,1)        AR(3)
Inﬂation  .840  .865  .666
(.103)  (.083)  (.123)
Anticipated .880  .928  .876  .930  .722  .719
Inﬂation  (.101)  (.113)  (.082)  (.098)  (.139)  (.186)
Unanticipated  .584  .592  .678  .710  .554  .625 
Inﬂation  (.176)  (.805)  (.161)  (.152)  (.191)  (.172)
Lagged-Wage  .284  .183  .238
Inﬂation  (.139)  (.174)  (.186)
AR(1)  -.060  .169  .026
(.260)  (.331)  (.333)
Notes on macro data:
price = GDP price deﬂator (DRI GDNFPC)
wage = Hourly compensation nonﬁnancial corp.  (DRI LCPB)
Table 1wages.  At 4 percent inﬂation there is only 
a 6 percent change in relative real wages.
The former correctly reﬂects productivity.
Thus, inﬂation does give us more efﬁcient
wage setting, but lower inﬂation in our 
case squeezes both tails.  I’m not sure the
squeezing of both tails would show up 
in any of the measures used in this paper.
Further research might include comparing
data from institutions with known nominal
wage rigidity with data from institutions
known to have ﬂexible wages.
During the discussion at the October
meeting, Bill Poole offered a telling objec-
tion to my illustrative histogram.  Some
people are denied tenure; effectively, their
wage change is –100 percent!  Much of the
wage rigidity literature carefully looks only
at “nonmovers.”  If we think carefully about
the role of wages in labor markets, we know
that labor force adjustments occur on both
the intensive (hours) and extensive (hire/
ﬁre) margins.  McLaughlin’s paper focuses
on nonmovers, as it should; but perhaps
there is more work to be done on the link-
age between wage rigidity and the intensive
versus extensive margin of labor force
adjustment.
In summary, this is a stimulating paper
that leaves the reader begging for more.  It
also is a great example of narrowly focused
scientiﬁc work that is enormously informa-
tive on a fundamental policy question; in this
case, “How much inﬂation should we have?”
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Figure 2
Illustrative (but Fictitious) Histogram
of Wage Increases in High vs. Low
Inflation Regimes
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